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ADMISSIONS

EDMUN'D M. MORGAN*
Personal and Adoptive
In Greenleaf's first edition, he adopted the dictum of Mascardus
that an admission is not evidence but a substitute for proof.,
This was repeated in the first fourteen editions following, was
copied by Taylor, was accepted by Wharton, apparently acquiesced in by Thayer, and later strenuously insisted upon by Professor Gifford at Columbia. Unless the dictum be given the interpretation put upon it by Gifford, that it takes the place of proof
so long as the jury does not disbelieve it, it would seem to mean
that an extra-judicial admission stands on the same basis as an
admission made in the pleadings or by stipulation in open court:
if it once be established that the admission was made, then the
matter admitted is beyond the realm of dispute in the case. And
there are a few English cases appearing to hold just that. When
Mr. Wigmore came to edit the sixteenth edition of Greenleaf, he
saw at once that these English cases were no longer law anywhere;
but he accepted Greenleaf's conclusion that an admission is not
evidence, by taking from it all its supposed power to establish the
matter stated in it and giving it only an impeaching effect.2 It is,
he said, like any unsworn contradictory statement of a witness,
which may be admitted to destroy his story on the stand but can
not be used to establish the opposite. He, therefore, defined it as
a statement inconsistent with the position which the admitter is
taking at the trial. It is receivable even if the admitter has not
testified, for it is contrary to the statements made or reasonably
implied in his pleadings; and no foundation by way of calling his
attention to the prior contradictory statem:ent is necessary. In the
first edition of Wigmore's own work, he took the same position;
but in the second, he bows to the practically unanimous holding
of the courts that an admission is receivable for the truth of the
*Acting Dean and Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1
GnEENLEAF, EVIDENCE (1st ed. 1842) § 169.
2Id. (16th ed. 1899) § 169. For Professor Gifford's criticism of Dean
Wigmore's view, see (1924) 24 Columbia L. Rav. 442444.
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matter asserted in it, and in some instances is, of itself, without
corroboration, sufficient to justify a finding. In some cases a few
courts have shown confusion. Where a party has testified, so a
negligible number of decisions say, the opponent cannot offer a
prior contradictory statement without laying the foundation required in the case of an ordinary witness, thus entirely overlooking the fact that such a statement is offered for its truth as well as
for its impeaching value.
Whether an admission is hearsay and is received as an exception
to the rule, while an interesting speculation, is hardly worth discussion from a practical viewpoint. Certainly it is receivable; its
reception is much older than the hearsay rule; it is an unsworn,
uncross-examined statement offered for the truth of the matter
asserted in it; and often it hasn't even an attenuated guaranty
of trustworthiness. It stands in a class by itself; the theory of its
admissibility has not the remotest connection with the jury system
and can be explained only as a corollary of our adversary system
of litigation. In the first place, the statement of the admitter may
be received even though he would be incompetent as a witness. Indeed, admissions were freely received when parties were incompetent and it was believed that they could not be trusted to tell
the truth on account of their interest in the outcome. Furthermore,
the admission of a child, who after examination by the court was
held incompetent because of his inability to understand the nature
; an oath, has been admitted against his guardian ad litem in an
action for injuries to the child.3 Admissions and confessions, made
while the speaker was in such a condition from intoxicants or in
such an hysterical condition that he could not have been permitted
to testify in open court, have been held competent.' And there
is authority for the reception of admissions obtained by duress.
Next, the admissions may be self-serving when made. Statements
made by the party when he was under a positive motive to misrepresent are admitted against him. Thus, in an action by Doxtator
against Cady for injury to Doxtator's car, Doxtator testified that
his brother-in-law was driving the car with Doxtator's knowledge
'The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Potter, 60 Kan. 808, 58
Pac. 471 (1899).
'See cases collected in Note (1931) 74 A. L. R. 1098, 1102 (intoxication); Friedman v. United Railways Co., 293 Mo. 235, 238 S. W. 1074
(1921) (hysteria); Middle Tennessee R. Co. v. McMillan, 134 Tenn. 490,
505, 184 S. W. 20 (1915) (partial consciousness).
'Fidler v. McKinley, 21 Ill. 308, 310, 317 (1859). Contra: Tilley v.
Damon, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 247 (1853). See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1923) §1050: "Since the Confessions-rule is peculiar to the situation of
the accused In a criminal case, an admission made under duress by a
party-opponent in a civil case is admissible, subject of course to comment
on its weight".
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and consent. Later when Cady sued him for damage done in the
collision, his former testimony, as well as the pleadings in the
former action, were held to be competent on the issue 'of the
brother-in-law's authority to drive the car.6 In like manner
where, in order to regain liquor taken in an allegedly unlawful
search and seizure, defendant swore that prohibition agents had
taken forty gallons of alcohol from the automobile which he was
driving, the court admitted the affidavit as evidence of defendant's
7
guilt in a prosecution for illegal transportation of the alcohol.
And, finally, the admission of a party cannot be excluded because
he was not testimonially qualified as to the subject matter of the
admission. In a New York case a defendant had told the coroner
that the accident was caused by the operator's inability to stop
the machine because the dog was out of position. In an action
for wrongful death, when this statement was offered against him,
the defendant proved that he was not present when the accident
occurred and had no personal knowledge as to its cause. The
statement was nevertheless held admissible. 8 Clearly, then, the
courts cannot be thinking of protecting the jury from being misled,
and they must be thinking solely of the adversary theory when they
receive unsworn and uncross-examined statements in the face of a
showing that the admitter has not the qualifications that would
permit him to be sworn as a witness, that he was under a positive
temptation to falsify rather than under an urge to tell the truth,
and that he had no opportunity to observe the things he described
in his admission. Every danger that cross-examination tends to
guard against is positively shown to be present in full force. Yet
the admitter is in effect told that he can not object, for he can
hardly be allowed to urge that he had no opportunity to crossexamine himself.
It must be noted that these cases deal with admissibility, and
not with the weight to be given to the evidence. Admissions not
based on personal knowledge, or in the form of unfounded opinion,
are frequently held insufficient of themselves to sustain a verdict
or finding.9 A somewhat similar problem is raised where so-called
admissions by conduct are involved. For example, in Harmon v.
Haas,10 and in Chaufty v. DeVries," shortly after an automobile
accident which occurred while defendant's child was driving, and
while defendant was absent so that he could have had no knowledge
'Cady v. Doxtator, 193 Mich. 170, 159 N. W. 151 (1916).
'Kaiser v. United States, 60 F. (2d) 410 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
'Reed v. McCord, 160 N. Y. 330, 54 N. E. 737 (1899).
'See e. g. cases collected Note (1908) 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1096.
1061 N. D. 772, 241 N. W. 70, 80 A. L. R. 3131 (1932).
"41 R. I. 1, 12, 13, 102 Atl. 612 (1918).
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of the circumstances, defendant transferred his property. This
was admitted against him in an action for injuries received by
plaintiff in the accident. The North Dakota Court accepted the
Rhode Island ruling and reasoning: "The transfer of defendant's
property so soon after the accident was a fact from which the
jury could draw an inference, based upon the defendant's conduct, taken in connection with other evidence and circumstances
in the case, unfavorable to the honesty and sincerity of the defense
put forward by him at the time of the trial." Now, does this mean
that the inference from the defendant's conduct is to his belief
that all his available evidence will be weak and ineffective, and
that from his belief the deduction may be made that his evidence
is so? If it means no more, the effect of this evidence of transfer
will not be to erect a case for the plaintiff. He must first do that
himself. Then evidence of the transfer may help him as the basis
for an inference of the weakness or invalidity of the defendant's
testimony. Its utmost effect can be corroborative of plaintiff's
case. But the court did not stop here. It went on and stated that
acts of this character by defendant "would operate like an admission of liability, and be equally competent. 'Admissions may be
by acts, as well as by words'." Now this must mean that such
conduct would have a substantial affirmative effect. Of course,
where the admitter had no personal knowledge, it could not, of
itself, support a verdict.
Again, there are numerous cases where testimony has been admitted that a party has sought either to bribe a witness to testify
in his behalf, or to refrain from testifying for the opponent, or
has destroyed evidence. It is almost universally held that testimony as to such conduct is competent; but what is its function?
Just what inference may be drawn from it? Will it establish an
affirmative case for the opponent? In the famous case of Pomeroy
v. Benton,12 Pomeroy sought an accounting from his former partner for profits made by Benton by the investment of partnership
funds in private ventures. It was shown that Benton kept a full
account of these in a private account book. After the action was
brought, he destroyed the pages of the book on which the items
concerning some of them were written. The court first found that
defendant destroyed the book for the purpose of concealing "the
magnitude of his operations in whisky". It then indulged in
the following rhetoric: ". . . the law, in hatred of the spoiler,
baffles the destroyer, and thwarts his iniquitous purpose, by indulging a presumption which supplies the lost proof, and thus
"77 Mo. 64, 85, 86, 90 (1882).
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defeats the wrong-doer by the very means he had so confidently
employed to perpetrate the wrong." It had no evidence of the
amount of defendant's profits and at first took as their measure
the amount of plaintiff's claim, namely, $200,000. Later, on a
showing that the destroyed pages affected not all the accounts but
only those concerning the whisky, it reduced the sum to $100,000,
fixing it at this figure because the several witnesses had testified
that they understood from the defendant that "his profits . . .
would be $100,000", from the whisky on hand. No other cases
go quite to this extent; and it is almost, if not quite impossible
to make any accurate generalization as to the effect to be given
such evidence. 13 It does impeach the case put forward by the party
in question; there are indications that it may act as positive corroboration of his opponent's case; but there is almost no real
authority and no decision which necessarily holds that it will serve
of itself to set up an essential element of the opponent's case.
We are almost equally in the dark as to the exact effect to be
accorded a positive disbelief of testimony given by a party himself
14
upon the stand. In some criminal cases in Pennsylvania and
15
New York the court has said that where the defendant put forth
a false theory of defense, or put in evidence, even by other than
himself, of an alibi which the jury found to be false, this could
be used as positive evidence of guilt. Last year the New York
Court of Appeals held that this was true only where there was
positive evidence that the alibi had been fabricated. 6 A mere disbelief is not enough. The language in other cases is generally to
the purport that it can be used only for impeachment, but the
decisions are few. In civil cases there are a goodly number of
square decisions that mere disbelief of a party's evidence will not
of itself sustain a finding of fact to the contrary. Thus, where
a divorced wife sought to set aside a judgment against her husband in favor of his father as having been founded upon a fictitious debt and entered in order to avoid the payment of alimony
which had been awarded, she called both defendants for crossexamination under the statute. Each testified there was a debt.
The trial judge found that there was no debt. In reversing, the
court said: "In their cross-examination under the statute the

"See generally Maguire and Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spolia-

tion or Related. Conduct (1935) 45 Yale L. J. 226; Pomeroy v.
discussed on pp. 240-243.
2'Pilger v. Commonwealth, 112 Pa. 220, 5 Atl. 309 (1886);
wealth v. McMahon, 145 Pa. 413, 22 At. 971 (1891).
"People v. Trombino, 238 N. Y. App. Div. 61, 263 N. Y.
(1933) aff'd. 262 N. Y. 689, 188 N. E. 122 (1933). See also
Deltsch, 237 N. Y. 300, 142 N. E. 670 (1923).
"People v. Russell, 266 N. Y. 147, 194 N. E. 65 (1935).

Benton is

CommonSupp. 456
People v.
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stories of the defendants were such that a jury might think them
untrue; but there was no evidence that there was no debt. The
court could not find a fact necessary to be proved, namely, that
there was no debt, as to which there was no affirmative testimony,
by a claim that the negative testimony was unworthy of belief.
This is the holding of the cases throughout."17 Whether, however,
disbelief of such testimony may serve as positive corroboration of
evidence to the contrary is not clear. There are at least a few cases
which say that it may. Here, then, is a subdivision of the law of
admissions wherein the courts have not yet gone far enough to
determine the exact effect that may be given to testimony which
is clearly admissible and to which the ordinary trier could scarcely
avoid giving some effect. The use of conduct of a party as circumstantial evidence of his state of mind, which, when found, is to be
used in turn as the basis for an inference to the facts which produced it, is constant and common, and is pertinent in situations
too numerous to catalogue.
A more limited but constantly expanding field is that of admissions by adoption, which tends to coincide on one border with the
admissions by such conduct as has just been discussed and on the
other with admissions by authorization. Of course, no objection
could be made to treating as an admission a statement made by a
third person if it is expressly adopted by a party. A certificate of
a physician as to the cause of death of an assured is normally inadmissible against the beneficiary in an action on the policy, for it
is pure hearsay. If in making proof of loss, however, the beneficiary, in answer to the question as to the cause of death, writes:
"As stated in the attached certificate of Dr. X," it is exactly as
if she had written the certificate herself. Under the generally
accepted rule, the fact that the admission is in the form of opinion
is immaterial.' Suppose, however, that the party who is alleged
to have adopted as an admission a statement made by another, has
"Moulton v. Moulton, 178 Minn. 568, 569, 227 N. W. 896 (1929).
"In some cases the courts seem to have gone to absurd lengths. For
example, in a Missouri case the beneficiary attached the certificate of a
Dr. Schultz, who wrote: "All evidence Indicated a holdup murder." The
insurance company offered this as evidence that the assured was murdered, for the policy did not cover death by murder. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial judge for excluding it, treating the statement exactly
as If it had been made by plaintiff herself since she warranted the truth
of the statements In the proof of loss. Mayhew v. Travelers' Protective
Ass'n. of America, 52 S. W. (2d) 29, 31 (Mo. App. 1932). See generally
cases collected In Notes (1922) 17 A. L. R. 366-372 and (1936) 42 Id.
1455. Of how much real value is a statement by the widow on the hearsay of a doctor, who himself was forming an opinion on hearsay as to
the very facts which were put to the jury? Is this decision an example
of the use of a rule of evidence to upset a verdict that the court did not
like?
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done nothing affirmatively to indicate his adoption. .A third party
makes an assertion in the presence of the defendant to which the
defendant makes no response and upon which he takes no action.
How can he be said to be in the same position as if he had uttered
the same words? Obviously only if the circumstances axe such
that his silence or inaction can be reasonably interpreted as an
assent. If he heard and understood the statement, if it was of such
content that a reasonable man would deny it if untrue, and if he
was in such a situation as to be free to deny it, it is reasonable
to infer that he assented to it. This is illustrated in numerous
criminal cases where a defendant has remained silent under an
accusation of crime.' 9 Whether he can be considered as free to
time is a question to which
deny it when he is under arrest at the
20
the courts give conflicting answers.
Now assume that the defendant, instead of remaining silent, gives
an equivocal answer. It is pretty obvious that he is not trying to
express the proposition that the third person's assertion is true.
Indeed, he must be either hoping to give the impression of its
untruth or intending to express his unwillingness to concede its
truth. Consequently, it is difficult to see how there can be any
rational inference that the situation is the same as if he had
expressly adopted the assertion. If the evidence is to be receivedand it is generally admitted-it must be on some other theory. The
third party's assertion is, by itself, pure hearsay and inadmissible
under any exception. Coupled with defendant's adoption, it is an
admission. Withouth the adoption, it is still an event occurring in
defendant's presence and having some relation to an issue in the
case. Defendant's reaction to it, assuming that he was conscious
of it, is relevant. It may indicate whether he believes the assertion
to be true. If so, then his belief is the basis of a deduction to the
existence of the fact believed. Even his express denial may be
made in such a manner as to justify the inference that he nevertheless believes the assertion to be true. If so, his conduct is equally
evidence, first, of his state of mind, and second, of the events
creating the state of mind. It is on this theory only that several
curious cases can be justified. The House of Lords held in 1914
that the trial judge had not erred in permitting a witness to testify
that a child who had been violated pointed to defendant and in his
presence said to her mother: "That is the old man," etc., to which
he responded: "I am innocent."12 1 The record does not disclose
2See cases collected in Note (1932) 80 A. L. R. 1229, 1235.

20See Comment (1920) 34 Hayv. L. REV. 205; Developments
idence (1933) 46 id. 1162; (1923) 21 Mier. L. PEv. 806.
Law-E
t

Rex v. Christie, (1914) A. C. 545, 562.

in the
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the demeanor of the defendant while making the denial. In California and in New York also an accusation and its denial have been
received.2 2 Mviost courts, proceeding on the adoption theory,
expressly reject accusations which are denied; those proceeding on
the other theory should require evidence from which a jury might
reasonably find that the manner of stating the denial was such as
to furnish the basis for an inference that the defendant believed
himself guilty. But there are some decisions, and it is often
assumed, that anything said in the presence of a party is admissible
against him. For such a doctrine there is not the slightest theoretical foundation.2 3
Factors applicable to admissions by adoption and to admissions
by authorization must be considered in dealing with statements
made by an attorney in behalf of his client. Averments in pleadings stand by themselves. Under the old equity system allegations
in the bill were regarded as mere surmises of the pleader rather
than as statements authorized by the party. Common law pleadings, designed primarily to discover and define the issues, contained so much of the technical and fictitious as to fall naturally
into the same class with the bill in equity. The answer in chancery
was, of course, a personal response of the party and was, for
evidential purposes, so treated. In handling pleadings under modern codes, the courts have been somewhat influenced by precedents
pertaining to common law pleading, but the majority hold averments in pleadings to be made, adopted or authorized by the party
and, therefore, admissible against him in the same or other proceedings.2 4 But what of statements made by counsel in the conduct of litigation? Is counsel the speaking agent of the party?
Or must the inquiry be whether he spoke in the presence and with
the apparent approval of the party? The courts appear to be
reluctant to charge a party with any but formal deliberate declarations of the attorney. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
25
expressed the general attitude of the judiciary when it said :
"Mferely casual, hasty, inconsiderate admissions of counsel in the
course of a trial, do not bind the client; they are not intended to
have such effect, nor does the nature of the relation of attorney
and client produce such result. And this is so, although the client
"People v. Philbon, 138 Cal. 530, 71 Pac. 650 (1903); People v. Hughson, 154 N. Y. 153, 47 N. E. 1092 (1897). It is possible to explain these
two cases on special grounds.
"See generally Comment (1929) 43 HARV. L. REv. 289; Maguire, Adoptive Admissions in Massachusetts (May, 1929) 14 MASS. L. Q. 62.
-"This subject is fully treated with ample citation of cases in 2 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
§§ 1063-1067.
"Davidson v. Gifford, 100 N. C. 18, 23 (1888).
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be present when such inconsiderate admissions are made. It would
be rude, indecorous, disorderly and confusing, if the client should
interpose to correct his counsel and disclaim his authority to make
such admissions. Neither the Court, counsel, nor any intelligent
person expects him to do so. And for the like reason, the client,
if examined as a witness, is not required to disclaim such admissions of his attorney, unless he shall be examined by the opposing
party for that purpose." If, however, counsel makes a considered
relevant statement, it need not be for the purpose of relieving the
opponent from proof, or be in the form of a stipulation. Thus, in
New Jersey in an action to recover for loss due to a fire the plaintiff was permitted to show that after the fire, an attorney for the
defendant railway company had appeared before the Public Service Commission and stated in effect that the defendant's right of
way was in bad condition in that combustible material had not
2
been cleared away, and that this was one of the causes of the fire.
Again, in a suit involving a patent by the Ward Baking Company
against the Hazleton Baking Company, 27 Mr. Beyer of the Beyer
Company was present during the whole trial. In the opening statement for defendant counsel asserted that the defense was being
conducted by the Beyer Company. In a later action between the
Beyer Company and the Fleischmann Company one of the issues
was whether the Beyer Company was bound by the judgment in
the Ward-Hazleton case. Upon this issue the assertion of counsel
in the opening statement in the Ward-Hazleton trial was held
28
admissible against the Beyer Company.
In like manner evidence given in behalf of a party at a former
trial may be brought up to plague him at a later trial, even where
it would not be admissible under the reported testimony exception,
either because the parties are not the same or because the witness
cannot be shown to be unavailable. Thus, in a West Virginia case
where plaintiff was suing for loss caused by fire, one of plaintiff's
theories was that the fire originated in defendant's dry kiln. At
the first trial defendant's witness Cairn testified that the fire
originated in a waste basket in which an employee had thrown his
cigar stubs, cigarette stubs and ashes. At the second trial, plaintiff offered this testimony of Cairn, who was not called but was
not shown to be unavailable. The Supreme Court held it reversible
error to reject the evidence, saying: "Of course, a party is not
bound by everything his witness may say on the stand, as an admis"Christy v. N. Y. C. and H. R. R. Co., 90 N. J. Law 540, 101 AtI. 372
(1917).
"292 Fed. 202 (D. C. Pa., 1923).
=Beyer Co. v. Fleischmann Co., 15 F. (2d) 465 (C C. A. 6th, 1926).
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sion, on his part, particularly where he does not know beforehand
what the witness is going to say; but if he puts a witness on the
stand, as defendant did in this case, to prove a particular fact in
issue, he is bound thereby as an admission on a subsequent trial. "'2
This seems to be the view accepted in most of the few American
cases, 0 though the English rule is to the contrary.3 1
Before considering vicarious admissions, a word as to personal
admissions in criminal cases is necessary. It is too well known to
justify elaboration that a confession obtained by improper inducement is inadmissible, and that where a defendant asserts such
improper inducement, he is entitled to a preliminary hearing upon
that question. On just what theory the confession so improperly
obtained is rejected is not clear. There are numerous statements
in the opinions that the ground of rejection is the danger that it
may be false. To some extent this theory is given support in the
cases allowing all or a portion of an improperly induced confession
to be received where investigation in reliance upon it has disclosed theretofore unknown corroborative facts 32 and, to a less
degree, in those allowing evidence of such facts and a showing
that they were discovered as a result of or following a conversation
with the accused.3 3 Some cases can be explained only on the sporting theory of a lawsuit.' 4 And in many the idea that the police
and prosecutor must be restrained from using third degree methods seems to furnish the rationale. There is, however, a growing
number of cases to the effect that this exclusionary rule, whatever
its basis, applies only to confessions--that is, to admissions of
guilt. It does not apply to the admissions of subordinate facts.
For example, in State v. Cook'-5 the defendant, taken to the scene
of an alleged attempt to break and enter in the night-time with
intent to steal, said: "That is the house. I tried to get in, but was
frightened away by the woman's scream." The court held the
confessions rule inapplicable because the statement did not admit
the criminal intent. Again, in a New Mexico case, 86 where defend'Keyser Canning Company v. Klots Throwing Company, 98 W. Va.
487, 496, 128 S. E. 280 (1925).
"Becker v. Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 344, 66 Atl. 564 (1907); Bageard v.
Consolidated Traction Co., 64 N. J. Law 316, 45 Atl. 620 (1900).
3"British Thomson-Houston Co., Ltd. v. British &c. Cables, Ltd. (1924)
1 Ch. 203, s. c. in Ct. of App. (1924) 2 Ch. 160.
"See Weller v. State, 16 Tex. Ct. App. 200 (1884) and Greer v. State,
116 Tex. Cr. 491 (1930) (statutory); Gregg v. State, 106 Ala. 44, 17 So.
321 (1894); STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (12th ed., 1936),
Article 23.
"See e. g. State v. Garrison, 59 Ore. 440, 117 Pac. 657 (1911).
31E. g. State v. Moran, 15 Ore. 262 (1887); Commonwealth v. Knapp,
10 Pick. 477 (Mass., 1830).
"188 Ia. 655, 661, 176 N. W. 674 (1920).
"'State v. Lindsey, 26 N. M. 526, 194 Pac. 877 (1921).
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ant was charged with bigamy, he said he had previously been
married to Y and didn't know whether he had been divorced from
Y. He did not admit the subsequent marriage to X. This likewise was held no confession. And an Idaho case$7 admitted a
statement by defendant to the sheriff that he wanted to plead
guilty, saying that it "borders closely on a confession, but we are
inclined to view it as partaking more of an admission." Now, in
all these cases the improper inducement held out was a promise
of more lenient treatment. No case of this kind has been found
which actually applied this rule to statements induced by physical
torture or threats of physical torture, although the language used
in the opinions makes no such discrimination.
It must be too clear for argument that an improperly induced
statement of a subordinate fact from which, in connection with
others, guilt may be deduced, is no more trustworthy than a statement of guilt. If in the Iowa case the defendant had said: "That
is the house. I tried to get in there to steal some money," how
would it have been entitled to any less credit than was the statement which he made? If these cases are to be explained, it must
be merely on the ground that the adversary theory applies to make
receivable all admissions; and that for'reasons of policy, based
either on a desire to require the police to make thorough investigations and not to rely on confessions, or on a sporting notion of fair
play to an opponent in a tight place, a cheek is put on the theory
in its application to straight admissions of guilt.
So far as regards admissibility, the segment of the rules of evidence dealing with admissions based on a party's own conduct is
consistent with itself, except perhaps that portion of it governing
confessions.
Vicarious
When the Committee of the United States Senate was investigating the leases made by Secretary Fall for the Government to the
Pan-American Oil Company, Mr. Doheny appeared and had read
to the Committee a prepared statement explaining his loan of
$100,000 to Fall. He also had counsel read a proposal to refer
the whole question to a board of experts, saying: "Mir.-Doheny
does not wish to have his company appear as dealing unfairly
with or taking advantage in any way of the Government. "38 Later,
when the United States brought action to cancel the leases, Mr.
Doheny claimed his privilege against self-crimination. The Government then offered against the corporation Mr. Doheny's state"State v. Garney, 45 Ida. 768, 265 Pac. 668 (1928).
"This is found on p. 206 of the printed record before the United States
Supreme Court. See note 40 infra.
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ment before the Investigating Committee. Was it admissible? To
be sure, Doheny was an officer of the corporation and had acted
for it in the negotiations for the leases; but was he acting as the
agent of the corporation before the Committee to such extent that
he was representing it in making his explanation of a personal
loan to Fall, in view of the fact that he was also personally interested in making that statment?
Of course, the ordinary principles of the law of agency apply
to narrative utterances as well as to words and nonverbal acts
which have an operative effect. Doheny's offer for the corporation
was admissible to show its terms just as fully as if the corporation
had been an individual and had itself made the offer. The mere
fact, however, that he was authorized to make the lease did not
give him any authority to talk about it afterward. A chauffeur
who is authorized to drive his master's car has no authority on
that account to talk about his driving. Hence, if he has an accident
and later tells W all about how it happened, W may not testify
against the chauffeur's master as to the chauffeur's statements.
Further, Doheny's being a witness before the Senate Committee
as to the facts bearing upon the lease would not, of itself, make
him a representative of the corporation. Suppose, for example,
in a prosecution of a chauffeur for criminal negligence in the
operation of an automobile, an officer of the corporation is called
to testify as a witness, either by the state or by the defendants;
and suppose that later the corporation is sued civilly for injuries
inflicted by the act for which the chauffeur was prosecuted; the
officer's testimony can not be received against the corporation as
an admission, for he was not acting within the scope of his authority as an officer while so testifying; and although he was making
assertions of facts within his knowledge concerning corporate mat39
ters, they cannot be considered as assertions of the corporation.
Consequently, the court in the Pan-AmericaN case had first to
determine whether Doheny in making his statement to the Committee was making it as an agent of the corporation and within his
authority as such agent. The trial court found that he was so acting and received the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed on the
ground that the trial judge was justified in "holding that, when
he (Doheny) testified before the committee, he was acting for the
' 40
companies within the scope of his authority."

"See Russell Products Co. v. Bailey, 162 Okla. 212, 19 P. (2d) 601
(1933); Louisa County Nat'l. Bank v. Burr, 198 Ia. 4, 199 N. W. 359
(1924); Hinton, Evidence-Admissioa by Officers of a Corporation (1927)
22 ILL. L. REv. 301.
'Pan American Petroleum and Transport Company v. United States,
273 U. S. 456, 499, 47 S. Ct. 416 (1927).

ADMISSIONS
The usual phrasing of the rule makes admissible against the
superior the utterances of the representative made within the scope
of his authority or employment. Suppose that a master directs
his investigator or claim agent to investigate and report to him the
cause of a particular accident. The agent does a thorough, workmanlike job and renders a detailed written report. Obviously,
he was hired for the very purpose of making the report; in writing
and transmitting it, he was acting squarely within the scope of
his employment. If the master is a corporation, the investigator's
duty may be to make the report to an officer of the corporation;
but essentially the situation is the same. Consequently, when the
reported is offered against the master, it seems to fall squarely
within the express words of the rule. And this seemingly ,has led
a number of courts to admit it."' But the fallacy is apparent upon
analysis. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply
between principal and agent or between master and servant. It is
only where the agent or servant represents the master in dealing
with third persons that the latter becomes responsible for the
former's acts. If the master had directed the investigator to report
the circumstances of the accident for him to the Industrial Commissioner or some other official or third party, then the doctrine
would be operative. The Restatement of Agency clearly makes the
distinction, and says expressly: "Statements by an agent to the
principal or to another agent of the principal are not admissible. "142
The test of admissibility is whether the agent "was authorized
to make the statement or was authorized to make, on the principal's
behalf, true statements concerning the subject matter.' '4 It will
be noticed that this distinctly does not make admissible non-operative statements of an agent in situations where his operative statements would make the principal substantively responsible. Substantively, if the agent acts within his express authority, or within
his ostensible authority even contrary to express instructions, or
within an authority created by estoppel, the principal will be as
responsible as if he had acted personally. But, merely because
the situation is such that had the words uttered been words of
offer, acceptance, warranty, or representation, the principal would
have been responsible, it does not follow that the words when
narrative are to be treated as words of the principal. But, if the

"See e. g. Lemen v. Kansas City Southern Railroad Company, 151 Mo.
App. 511, 132 S. W. 13 (1910). Cases are collected In Notes (1909) 18
L. R. A. (N. s.) 231; (1910) 25 if. 930; (1914) 47 it.830.
"2RESTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) § 287; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, EXPLANATORY NoTEs (Tent Draft No. 5 1930) pp. 73-102 collects the pertinent
cases.
"'RESTATEMENT, AGENCY

(1933) § 286.
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agent has an authority to talk about the subject-matter, then his
narrative is to be received. This accords with the theory back of
the reception of personal admissions. If the party has authorized
another to speak for him, he can not object that the speaker was
not under oath or subject to cross-examination when he spoke.
Partnership is in this aspect one form of agency. Within the
scope of the partnership business, each partner is an agent for all.
Are the partners authorized to make statements about partnership
matters? Take first cases where a tort has been committed by a
servant of the partnership, and it is established that the matter
as to which the servant was acting was a partnership affair. A
partner admits the existence of a defect in the instrumentality
involved. Is this receivable against the other partners? Theoretically no, unless the speaker was authorized to talk about it. And
such is the holding in about half of the pertinent cases. In the
others, it seems to be assumed that the partner has such authority,
for the evidence is received. And in contract actions, the holdings
are almost unanimous to that effect." In this respect the language
of many of the decisions makes no distinction between the situation where the words would be operative to create legal relations
and the situation where they can have no operative effect and are
merely narrative and evidential. If they are to be harmonized
with the agency cases, it must be on the ground that each partner
has authority to talk about any partnership transaction.41
The confusion exhibited in these cases is much more striking in
the conspiracy cases. Of course, any act of any conspirator, verbal
or nonverbal, done in the furtherance of the conspiracy affects
each of his co-conspirators as if the latter had himself done it.
So, any narrative of one, if uttered in furtherance of the conspiracy, may be received as an admission against each of the
others: but one may make a statement concerning the conspiracy
while it is still in the course of being planned or executed, which
in no way furthers it and which, in fact, is a most effective way
of blocking it. Such a statement, admissible against the speaker,
is, on theory, inadmissible against his fellow conspirators. Some
cases make the distinction clearly ;4,6 others, while stating it, assume
that every declaration concerning the conspiracy made while it is
still brewing is in furtherance of it. The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit was puzzled by previous decisions of the
United States Supreme Court and resolved the enigma thus :
"See accord Merrill v. O'Dryan, 48 Wash. 415, 93 Pac. 917 (1908).

"The cases are collected in Note (1931) 73 A. L. R. 427, 433, 447.
"See e. g. People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95, 103 (1874).
'International Indemnity Co. v. Lehman, 28 F. (2d) 1, 4 (C. C. A. 7th,
1928).
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"The rule-we deduce from these cases is that an admission of
one conspirator, if made during the life of the conspiracy, is
admissible against a joint conspirator, when it relevantly relates
to and is 'in furtherance of the conspiracy.' Construing the
expression 'in furtherance of the conspiracy' reference is not to
the admission as such, but rather to the act concerning which the
admission is made; that is to say, if the act or declaration, concerning which the admission or declaration is made, be in furtherance of the conspiracy, then it may be said that the admission is
in furtherance of the conspiracy."
This is employing a time-honored judicial device to make new
law without appearing to neglect, much less to abuse, the doctrine
of stare decisis. It may indicate a change in the substantive law
of conspiracy or merely the evolution of a new exception to the
hearsay rule.
What is the explanation of the large group of cases in which the
declaration of a principal is received in an action against a surety?
First, is the contract of guaranty or suretyship to be construed
as a promise by the surety to be responsible for the acts of the
principal to such an extent that the promisee need show only that
he could have established his claim against the principal? If so,
then any evidence receivable against the principal would be
admissible against the surety. There is a suggestion to this effect
in a Vermont case ;48 and a theory of this sort is embodied in the
California Code of Civil Procedure (See. 1851): "where the
question in dispute between the parties is the obligation or duty
of a third person, whatever would be the evidence for or against
such person is prima facie evidence between the parties." Under
the generally accepted interpretation of the usual guaranty contract, however, the surety promises to answer only for certain
conduct of the principal and not for his narrations about it. And
ordinarily the test of admissibility of evidence against the surety
will not be its admissibility against the principal. But one item
of the principal's conduct is the rendering of an account of his
doings in the performance of his obligation. Consequently, it may
be said without unreason that the surety authorizes the principal
to make statements as to the performance of his obligations both
for himself and for the surety. This will place the principal's
statements made within the authorization on the same basis as
those of an agent. This explanation has been made by a Canadian
"Jangraw v. Perkins, 79 Vt. 107, 64 AtI. 449 (1906). Similar reasoning
has been used in actions against a sheriff for an escape. Sloman v. Herne,
2 Esp. 695 (1799); Hart. v. Stevenson, 25 Conn. 499 (1857). See STAKIaE,
EVIDENCE (5th Am. ed., 1834) 740.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
court ;41 and it will justify the result reached in a great majority
of the cases. It will not, however, account for the reception of
statements made by the principal to outsiders, e. g. to the Chief
of Police after his arrest; or even to the employer-promisee after
the employment has terminated. There are a few modern cases
tending to exclude such statements to outsidersY'
The suretyship cases lead to those dealing with declarations of
joint-obligors. Here we go back to the mighty Lord Mansfield for
the dictum that one joint-obligor is "virtually" an agent of the
rest, so that "an admission by one, is an admission by all"' Such
an adverb is a convenient covering for loose thinking or none at
all; and though its fallacy has been exposed, the authority of this
great judge has generally prevailed. In modern times it has been
buttressed by that of the greatest living master, Wigmore, who
says :52
(1) "So far as one person is privy in obligation with another,
i. e., is liable to be affected in his obligation under the substantive
law by the acts of the other, there is equal reason for receiving
against him such admissions of the other as furnish evidence of
the act which charges them equally." At the risk of conviction of
treason, it is suggested that this sentence would read as well and
carry quite as much conviction if changed thus: "Although one
person is privy in obligation with another, etc., there is no reason
for receiving against him such admissions, etc." It would then
be supported by all the cases which refuse to receive against one
conspirator confessions made by another after termination of the
conspiracy; the confession of a principal against his accessory;
the narratives of a servant causing a tortious injury against his
master; and by the majority of American cases which reject against
a partner, statements made by another partner after dissolution
of the partnership.
(2) "Not only as a matter of principle does this seem to follow,
since the greater here may be said to include the less; but also as
a matter of fairness, since the person who is chargeable in his
obligations by the acts of another can hardly object to the use of
such evidence as the other may furnish."
Again, the query presents itself, what is "matter of principle"?
'Jordan School Dist. v. Gaetz, 23 D. L. R. 739, 745 (1915).

Knott v. Peterson, 125 Ia. 404, 407, 101 N. W. 173, 174 (1904); Atlas
Shoe Co. v. Bloom, 209 Mass. 563, 95 N. E. 952 (1911); Graves v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 215 Ala. 250, 110 So. 390 (1926). Cf. Dietrich v. Dr. Koch Vegetable Tea Co., 56 Okla. 636, 156 Pac. 188 (1916).
"Whitcomb v. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652, 653 (1781).
§ 1077. The next two quotations
12 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
are a part of the same paragraph.
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If it connotes consistency with other recognized rules of law, it
necessarily implies a selection of those rules that happen to please
the user of the phrase. In this instance it rejects the rules to
which attention has just been called in agency, conspiracy, and partnership. If it refers to the mathematical maxim that the greater includes the less, it overlooks the essential of identity of kind. A bushel
of apples does not include a pint of peanuts. As to the matter of
fairness, this must be a matter of judgment, this should put one
to an examination of the basis for admitting any evidence. As a
matter of fairness generally all relevant evidence should be received, but the great bulk of the rules of evidence have to do with
the rejection of relevant evidence.
(3) "Moreover, as a matter of probative value, the admissions
of a person having precisely the same interests at stake will in
general be likely to be equally worthy of consideration."
This may be true enough, but it entirely disregards the theory
upon which admissions are received-which has nothing at all to
do with their trustworthiness. And if it had, how can identity of
legal obligation indicate identity of trustworthiness of the obligors?
It is, therefore, submitted that if the reception of this class of
evidence is to be justified, it must be on some other grounds than
those expressed in the opinions and by the commentators.
The same sort of suggestion is applicable to the doctrine which
sanctions the reception of declarations of the former owner of a
property interest against his successor in interest. It begins with
Lord Ellenborough and continues through Wigmore. Here Mr.
Wigmore advances no independent reasons, but is content to rest
upon the reasoning of Mr. Justice Henderson of North Caroliwa,
Mr. Justice Kennedy of Pennsylvania, and the New York commentators, Cowen and Hill. Mr. Justice Henderson adduces the
following "plainest reasons" :"
"Truth is the object of all trials, and a person interested to
declare the contrary, is not supposed to make a statement less
favorable to himself than the truth will warrant; at least there is
no danger of overleaping the bounds of truth as against the party
making the declarations. It is therefore evidence against him, and
his subsequent purchaser stands in his situation; for he cannot
better his title by transferring it to another, or thereby affect the
rights of those who have an interest in his confessions."
Note, (1) that the declarant is assumed to be "interested to declare the contrary"; that is to say, his statement has the guaranty
of trustworthiness that the fact stated is disserving. His successor
3Guy v. Hall, 3 2Murph. 150, 151 (N. C. 1819).
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stands in the deelarant's shoes. It may be granted that this is true
substantively. To assume that it must, therefore, be true evidentially is to leap a long logical gap, and to forget the postulate with
which Mr. Justice Henderson began: "Truth is the object of all
trials". It is for this reason that statements not subject to crossexamination are usually excluded. Where a person makes a statement consciously contrary to his interest, it has such a characteristic of credibility as to justify dispensing with cross-examination.
As pointed out before, the admission of a party, if not disserving
when made, is received not because it has any earmarks of abstract
verity but because he cannot object to the lack of the usual safeguards against his own utterance. Why should he be compelled
to vouch for the veracity of his predecessor? (2) To say that
others have an interest in the "confessions" of the predecessor
which cannot be destroyed by a transfer is not to give a reason
but to restate the result in terms which assume testimony to have
the qualities of a vendible commodity.
Messrs. Cowen and Hill, whose "masterly exposition" of the
doctrine is likewise highly commended by Dean Wigmore, offer
the following justification :5
"This doctrine proceeds upon the idea that the present claimant
stands in the place of the person from whom his title is derived;
has taken it cum onere; and as the predecessor might have taken
a qualified right, or sold, charged, restricted or modified an absolute right, and as he might furnish all the necessary evidence to
show its state in his own hands, the law will not allow third persons to be deprived of that evidence by any act of transferring the
right to another. Declarations made by the predecessor are a part
of the res gestae, whether accompanied with acts of possession or
forbearance, so much so, indeed, that . . . they might for many

purposes be evidence in his own favor to fortify his claim; but,
above all, to weaken or contract it."
The first part of this quotation may be accepted as an accurate
statement of the substantive law. The last part may be entirely
disregarded as mere "sound, signifying nothing", for the assertion that the declarations are part of the res gestae in this connection is wholly meaningless. It at once raises the suspicion that the
distinguished authors were not quite satisfied with their previous
reasons and that their most definite idea about the matter was the
conviction that the evidence should be received. This leaves only
the conclusion that "the law will not allow third persons to be
deprived of the evidence by an act of transferring the right to
"'In 1

PHILLIPS, EVIDENCE 314, n. 104.
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another". Insofar as this is anything zore than a statement of
the result, it merely suggests that when an opponent has evidence
that would be admissible against X, it is unfair to let that evidence
be destroyed by a transfer of property from X to Y. It is not a
suggestion that the transfer closes up the source of information,
for at the time Messrs. Cowen and Hill wrote, the direct opposite
might be true. If the transfer divested the grantor of interest, it
would in fact open up the source of testimony by making the
grantor a competent witness, whereas before the transfer, he would
have been incompetent. And it was not suggested at that time, that
a competent witness could not be made incompetent by the device
of a transfer of interest to him, or an incompetent witness made
competent by his putting aside all interest.5 5 In short, Messrs.
Cowen and Hill and Mr. Justice Henderson differ only in phraseology.
Mr. Justice Kennedy, after making a number of assertions concerning admissions or confessions of a litigant, some of which are
at least debatable, shows that as a matter of substantive law, a successor in interest obtains no more than his predecessor had. He
says that evidence admissible against the former ought to be
equally so against the latter, and proceeds: "Lord Ellenborough
has given the true reason of the rule for admitting the declarations of a party in evidence,... where he says, it 'is founded upon
a reasonable presumption that no person will make any declaration
against his interest, unless it be founded in truth.' If true when
made, and therefore receivable in evidence, his selling or disposing
of the property afterwards cannot make his former declaration in
respect to it untrue, nor furnish any reason, that I can perceive,
which ought to derogate from its character as evidence. But I
cannot avoid believing that as long as the great object of receiving
testimony is to aid in and promote the investigation of truth, the
declarations or admissions of a vendor or assignor against his interest, made before the sale or assignment, may be more safely relied
on and received in evidence against his vendee or assignee, than
the testimony that would be given by such vendor or assignor
himself, if the party claiming in opposition to his vendee or assignee, must be compelled to resort to him.' '
The learned justice, then, makes the rationale of the rule incompatible with the reception of any self-serving or neutral declarations of the predecessor. The sole substitute for cross-examination
is the disserving quality of the declaration. Privity alone and of
quoting Dentham; 5 JoNqs, EWcited.
4Gibblehouse v. Strong, 3 Rawle 437, 449 (Pa. 1832).

WSee 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 576,
DENCE (2d ed. 1926) § 2119 and cases
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itself, therefore, cannot suffice; it may perhaps obviate the necessity of showing the declarant unavailable; it furnishes no guaranty
of trustworthiness.
These lines of reasoning would make receivable against the successor all statements by his predecessor, but it is agreed that only
those made while the predecessor had the very interest which the
successor is now claiming are receivable against the latter. Baron
Parke suggested an additional limitation: the declaration must
"affect or qualify the title.''61 In its application he did not consider as affecting the title any facts which merely put a limitation
upon the declarant's right to convey to another, as where while
indebted to A and having insufficient assets to meet the indebtedness, he conveyed gratuitously to B. Baron Parke declared inadmissible against B the declaration of B's predecessor that he was
indebted to A. The Iowa Court reached the opposite result;518 and
North Carolina and Alabama, in an action by the predecessor's
creditor to set aside a conveyance to B, have received against B
declarations of B's predecessor that he was not indebted to B."
The construction put upon this limitation is important in will
cases. If title be construed broadly enough to include the power to
transfer to anyone willing to take, the testator's assertion of a fact
showing incapacity to transfer by will, will be receivable against
his legatee or devisee. But under both views declarations by a testator of facts tending merely to validate or destroy a particular testamentary document must be rejected. In like manner, where a conveyance or transfer is attacked for fraud or duress, the predecessor's
statements of facts which in no way affect his own interest in the
property but which do affect the validity of the transfer will, under
either construction, be inadmissible. Messrs. Cowen and Hill, of
course, would have repudiated this restriction in toto, for they
argued vigorously for the reception of all relevant utterances of
testators. On this theory they justified and approved Reel v.
Reel,60 a leading authority for the reception of post-testamentary
declarations. Baron Parke's idea, however, seems to have pre.
vailed in these lines of cases. While the courts have relied upoT
the doctrine of privity to admit statements of a testator regardinf
the quantum or quality of his estate,6 ' they have dealt with dec
larations concerning his testamentary capacity and the validity o
"Coole v. Braham, 3 Exch. 183 (1848).
"Moss & Co. v. Dearing, 45 Ia. 530 (1877).
"Satterwhite v. Hicks, 1 Busbee L. 105 (N. C. 1852); Moses v. Di
ham, 71 Ala. 173 (1881).
01 Hawks 248 (N. C. 1821).
'2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1081.
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his will on an entirely different basis.62 Likewise only a small
minority of decisions use privity as a ground for receiving declarations by a predecessor of facts which tend only to impair or validate a conveyance or transfer without affecting his then existing
interest in the property.
The rationale of these limitations has no relation to trustworthiness, and the doctrine even thus circumscribed produces some curious results. Where an insurance company is attacking the validity
of the policy and offers against the beneficiary, statements made
by the assured of facts which would impair or destroy it, their
admissibility depends, according to some decisions, not at all on
the circumstances of their utterances, but upon the wording of the
policy. 83 If the assured has reserved the right to change the beneficiary, then the sorcery of privity is present to provide a cloak
for their reception; if he has made no such reservation, no magic
covering hides their hearsay infirmity; unless they come clothed
with some guarantee of trustworthiness, they are rejected. In
another field, a modern Massachusetts decision demonstrates the
illegitimacy of privity as a test of admissibility. In an action for
wrongful death, the administrator was claiming damages for conscious suffering of the decedent and for the loss to the next of kin.
The decedent's statement, "it is my fault, I am to blame", was
received, on the issues of negligence and contributory negligence,
in opposition to the claim for conscious suffering, and was rejected
on the same issues in opposition to the claim for loss to the next
of kin.64 Almost as much a shock to common sense are the cases
dealing with the admissibility of a bankrupt's schedules. If a
bankrupt files a schedule with his voluntary petition, his statenmfents therein are made while he is owner; the title has not yet
passed to his trustee. If he becomes an involuntary bankrupt, his
schedule is made after the trustee acquires title. In the former
situation, the schedule is admissible against the trustee, in the
latter, inadmissible. The absurdity of this distinction so impressed
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that they
entirely disregarded it. 65 They accepted without much examination
the decisions admitting the schedules of the voluntary bankrupt,
and then, finding the schedule of an involuntary bankrupt quite as
trustworthy, held its rejection reversible error. The same reasoning would destroy the distinctions relied on in the insurance cases
"3 i. §§ 1734-1740.
"2 id. § 1081 and cases cited in note 6; Kales, Admissibility of Declarations of the Insured against the Beneflciary (1906) 6 Col. L. Rev.
509.
"Eldridge v. Barton, 232 Mass. 183, 122 N. E. 272 (1919).
"In re Weissman, 19 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
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and wrongful death actions. Indeed, it would so damage the
whole doctrine as to require a complete reexamination of its
fundamentals.
Such a reexamination would be welcome. The dognma of vicarious
admissions, as soon as it passes beyond recognized principles of
representation, baffles the understanding. Joint ownership, joint
obligation, privity of title, each and all furnish no criterion of
credibility, no aid in the evaluation of testimony. Yet it is not
difficult to rationalize about their origin as indicia of admissibility.
An examination of the pertinent precedents discloses that in most
of them the admitted declarations were of facts palpably against
the interest of the declarant. In the late 1700s and early 1800s
the exception to the hearsay rule for declarations of facts against
interest had established itself in essence, though some details
remained to be worked out. It was not until after 1800 that the
unavailability of the declarant became a thoroughly recognized
requisite,6 6 and it was some years later before the exception was
restricted to statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest.6
Both of these restrictions were entirely without justification. The
very basis of the exception-that the statement is of a fact consciously against interest when made-makes it plain that a statement is likely to be quite as reliable as the testimony of the declarant. And to treat a declaration against pecuniary or proprietary
interest as more likely to be in accord with truth than a declaration against penal interest is blindly to disregard realities. The
development of these abnormalities to the detriment of this exception invited recourse to the concurrently evolving doctrine of
vicarious admissions.
Even today it is often very difficult to determine whether the
courts are relying upon the disserving character of the statement
or the bond of common interest to warrant the reception of extrajudicial declarations of a joint owner, joint obligor, or predecessor
in interest. 8 Until after the first third of the nineteenth century,
the former element was usually given the greater weight. Vague
analogies of the doctrine of res adjudicata furnished plausible
ground for shifting the emphasis. Since both elements were usually
present in the same case, the courts, under no compulsion to choose
"See Walker v. Broadstock, 1 Esp. 458 (1795) and Doe ex dem. Hindly
v. Rickarby, 5 Esp. 4 (1803), in which extra-judicial declarations against
interest by living witnesses were admitted.
"The Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Cl. & F. 85 (1844).
"See Falcon v. Famous Players Film Co., (1926) 2 K. B. 474; Fourth
National Bank v. Albaugh, 188 U. S. 734, 736-7 (1903); CAL. CODE CIV.
PRoc. (Deering, 1923) § 1849; MONT. REV. CODES (Choate, 1921) § 10510;
ORE. LAws (Olson, 1920) § 706; Washoe Copper Co. v. Junila, 43 Mont.
178, 185, 115 Pac. 917, 919 (1911).
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between them, wandered about in a bog of uncertainty. Then
with the ill-advised assistance of commentators like Messrs. Cowen
and Hill they selected as their guide the ignis fatus of privity.
The results, as might have been anticipated, have been lamentable.
Testimony has been received or rejected without reference to its
capability of evaluation by the trier. Self-serving statements without the slightest guaranty of trustworthiness have been admitted;
disserving declarations with every badge of credibility have been
excluded.
To furnish a real remedy for this intolerable situation would
require a thorough revision of the rules governing the admissibility
of declarations against interest and of vicarious admissions. It
is past hope of realization within the reasonably near future. A
partially satisfactory solution, however, may not be beyond attainment. The cases admitting declarations against the interest of the
predecessor or joint obligor or joint owner reach a desirable and
theoretically justifiable result. All courts and commentators agree
that a sufficient guaranty of trustworthiness is found in the circumstance that the fact stated is consciously against the interest
of the declarant. There is also an adequate necessity for using it.
To paraphrase Mr. Justice Kennedy's dictum, such an utterance
may be more safely relied on than the testimony that would be
given by the declarant himself. In this respect it stands on a
footing equal if not superior to that supporting the now established
hearsay exception admitting spontaneous statements. Here, then,
are ideal conditions for an exception to the hearsay rule with none
of the absurdities that disfigure the orthodox exception for declarations against interest. The element of joint interest, joint responsibility, or privity of title, which distinguishes these cases factually
from those involving ordinary utterances against interest, may
well be seized as an excuse for discriminating legally-for disregarding those limitations in the accepted rule which exclude
declarations against penal interest and demand the unavailability
of the declarant. The adoption of this suggestion would, to be
sure, compel the repudiation of those decisions admitting selfserving or neutral declarations on the sole ground of privity or
joint interest or joint responsibility, but they are comparatively
few in number. On the other hand, it would make no change at
all in the cases where the declarant really represents the party
against whom his declaration is offered. It would continue the
practice of receiving disserving statements of one joint owner or
joint obligor against another and of a predecessor in interest
against his successor, but would liberalize it by including all
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relevant declarations against such declarant's interest, pecuniary
or proprietary or penal. It would hasten the accomplishment of
the end for which the courts appear to be striving in the conspiracy cases, for even where a conspirator's utterances are without the scope of his authority as a representative of his fellows,
they are usually against his penal interest. It would to some
extent eliminate the necessity for bizarre interpretations of
accepted generalizations to make them seem applicable to situations
to which they are totally inapplicable. It would reduce but not
remove the occasion for absurd distinctions in the insurance and
wrongful death actions. In a word, it would tend to put on a
rational basis a substantial segment of the hearsay rule. It would,
of course, leave much, very much, to be desired; but it must be
realized that in liberalizing the rules of evidence, the courts make
haste slowly.6 9t

OThe subject-matter of this paper has been dealt with by the writer
in Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule (1921) 30
YALE L. J. 355 and Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions (1929)
42 HARV. L. REV. 461. The material in the latter article has been used extensively in this paper; and large portions of it have been copied verbatim.
fThe third of a series of papers upon the law of evidence presented
by Professor Morgan to the Seattle Dar in July, 1936, revised by the
author for publication. For previous articles in this series see (January,
1937) 12 WASH. L. REV. 1 and (April, 1937) 12 WASH. L. REV. 91. The
final paper of this series will appear In the November, 1937, issue of the
REVIEW.

